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validity of state statutes and court rules relating to notice by publication
would be limited, especially as applied in probate proceedings and other
actions similar to common trust settlements.
This was followed by
statutory changes'" varying considerably in their provisions and in the
scope of their coverage. The Walker decision calls for a close reexamination of notice requirements in all of the states, and for provision to be
made for at least a letter in all cases where an address is available.w
JOHN

Credit Transactions-Deficiency Judgment Statute-Suit

L.

DAVIDSON.

on the Note

In Fleishel v. Jessup," plaintiff was holder of promissory notes secured by deed of trust executed by defendant for the purchase price of
land, equipment, and machinery.
After sale, plaintiff sued for deficiency
judgment.
The trial court excluded defendant's evidence bearing 011 the
question of whether certain structures were real or personal property.
Judgment for plaintiff was reversed on appeal on the ground that defendant was entitled to have the jury decide the question of what proportion of the value of all the property was realty.v As to such proportion plaintiff was not entitled to deficiency judgment under G. S.
§ 45-21.383

'244 N. C. 451, 94 S. E. 2d 308 (1956).
The court points out that as between vendor and vendee, personal property
affixed to land passes by a conveyance of the land unless expressly excepted. Horne
v. Smith, IDS N. C. 322, 11 S. E. 373 (1890) (engine and boiler connected to mam
building of saw mill); Moore v, Valentine, 77 N. C. 188 (1877) (mining machinery); Bryan v, Lawrence, SO N. C. 337 (1858) (planks laid down, but not
nailed, on the upper floor of gin house). As between landlord and tenant, fixtures
placed on the land for purposes of trade are removable by the tenant at the expir~tion of the term without provision in the lease for removaL Springs v. Arlannc
Refining Co., 205 N. C. 444, 171 S. E. 635 (1933), Note, 12 N. C. 1.. REV. 273
(1934).
a Ct. CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC.§ 580 (b) (1955), which provides that where both
a chattel mortgage and real estate deed of trust are given to secure payment of the
balance of the combined purchase price of real and personal property, no deficiency
2
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The provisions of G. S. § 45.21.38 are as follows: "In all sales of real
property by mortgagees and/or trustees under powers of sale contained
in any mortgage or deed of trust .. " or where j udgrnent or decree is
given for the foreclosure of any mortgage ... to secure payment of the
balance of the purchase price of real property, the mortgagee or trustee
or holder of the notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall
not be entitled to a deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage,
deed of trust or obligation secured by the same: Provided, said evidence
of indebtedness shows upon the face that it is for balance of purchase
money for real estate ....
"Whenever a power of sale contained in a conditional sale contract,
or granted by statute with respect thereto, is exercised, and the proceeds of such sale are not sufficient to defray the expenses thereof, and
also the expenses of retaking, keeping and storing the goods and the
balance due upon the purchase price, the seller may recover the deficiency
from the buyer. ... "
A question still unanswered in North Carolina is whether the holder
of a note secured by mortgage or deed of trust given for the purchase
price of land can disregard the security and sue on the note. It is settled
in North Carolina and elsewhere that a creditor holding collateral
security may ignore the security and bring action on the note," absent a
statute restricting the right.'
It is apparent that G. S. § 45-21.38 does
not expressly restrict the right.
By its terms the statute is applicable
only when there has been a sale or foreclosure. The thing prohibited is
a deficiency judgment, which by definition is a judgment for the difference between the amount realized on a sale of security and the amount
of the debt." "There can be no deficiency until there is a sale."?
judgment lies under either. Other state statutes abolishing deficiency judgments
on purchase price transactions are applicable only to real property.
See, e.q.,
MONT. REV. CODES AN NOT. § 93-6008 (1949):
ORE. REV. STATS. § 88.070 (1955).
As to sales where both real and personal property are involved, N. C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 45-21.8, 9 seem to put it within the discretion of the person exercising the
power of sale as to whether the sale shall be in whole or in parcels. Where the
sale is of all the property securing the debt, the principal case indicates that a
deficiency judgment can be obtained as to the proportion of the value of all the
property which is personal property.
Brown v. Turner, 202 N. C. 227, 162 S. E. 608 (1932); Silvey v. Axley, 118
N. C. 959, 23 S. E. 933 (1896): Beckett v. Clark, 225 Iowa 1012, 282 N. W. 724
(1938). "The obligation of the debtor to respond in his person and property is the
same as if no security had been given. The promise to pay, as evidenced by a
promissory note, is one distinct agreement and, if couched in proper terms, is negotiable, while the pledge of real estate to secure that promise, as evidenced by a
mortgage, is another distinct agreement which is not intended to affect in the least
the promise to pay, but only to provide a remedy for the failure of performance."
37 AM. JUR. MORTGAGES § 517 (1941).
11 An example of such a statute is CALIF.
CODE CIV. PROC.§ 726 (1955), which
prevents the personal action against the debtor until the creditor has exhausted the
security.
6 In Phillips v. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., 88 F. 2d 188 (8th Cir. 1937), it
was held that an action for personal judgment on mortgage notes before foreclosure
4
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The real question, then, is whether the statutory policy will be extended to cut off the heretofore recognized right of the creditor to proceed against the debtor in personam on the note.
The court has said that the statute is a limitation upon the jurisdiction
of the courts, operative only upon the adjective or procedural law and not
upou the substantive law." The right to payment of a debt evidenced
by a promissory note is a substantive right.
It logically follows that
the statute has left untouched the creditor's right to recover on the note.
In Brown v. Kirkpatrick,9 the purchase money note was secured by
a second deed of trust. The land had been sold for only enough to satisfy
the first deed of trust. It was held that the statute did not prohibit plaintiff from obtaining judgment on the note.!" The court said: "In this
situation the court will not extend by judicial interpretation
the provisions of the statute, and deny him the right to judgment for a valid
debt."!'
The decision may indicate a reluctance to extend the operation
of the statute beyond its express terms.
More significant is the fact that the court, in sustaining its interpretation of the statute in the Brown case, cited Page v. Ford,12 which holds
that an Oregon statute':' substantially identical to G. S. § 45-21.38 does
was not an action for deficiency judgment within the Minnesota Moratorium Act
(which provided that there could be no deficiency judgment until the expiration
of the period fixed for redemption), the words, "deficiency judgment," referring to
the balance of personal indebtedness above the amount realized on sale of mortgaged
property securing such indebtedness.
1 Fleishel v. Jessup, 242 N. C. 605, 89 S. E. 2d 160 (1955), a prior action between the same parties and on the same facts as in the principal case. The trial
court accepted the value of the land as agreed, deducted the amount from the total
amount of the notes, and rendered deficiency judgment for the balance. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judgment was premature because there
had been no sale.
'Bullington
v, Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. 2d 411 (1941), holding that the
statute deprived the court of jurisdiction to grant a deficiency judgment in favor
of a citizen of Virginia suing on purchase money notes executed in Virginia and
secured by land located in that state.
'217 N. C. 486, 8 S. E. 2d 601 (1940).
10 Contra, Brown v. Jensen, 41 Cal. 2d 219, 259 P. 2d 425 (1953), cert. denied,
347 U. S. 905 (1954). CALIF. CODE Crv. PROC. § 580 (b) (1955) provides in part,
"No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after sale of real property ... under
deed of trust, or mortgage, given to secure payment of the balance of the purchase
price of real property." The words, "deficiency judgment ... after sale," in the
statute were construed to mean judgment after actual sale or a situation wherea
sale would be an idle act, i.e., where the security is exhausted. The court said
that since a deficiency is nothing more than the difference between the security and
the debt, the deficiency judgment prohibited is still a deficiency judgment even
though it consists of the whole debt. The dissent emphasized the fact that the term,
"deficiency judgment," refers to a judgment for the balance due on the personal
obligation after sale. Though § 580 (b) was held to bar suit, the court reiected
defendant's argument that the statute preventing a personal action until the credItor
has exhausted the security (supra note 5) precludes suit on the note when the
security is valueless.
n Brown v. Kirkpatrick,
217 N. C. 486, 488, 8 S. E. 2d 601, 602 (1940).
,. 65 are. 450, 131 P. 1013 (1913).
18 ORE. REV. STATS.
§ 88.070 (1955). "When a decree is given for the fore-
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not prevent plaintiff from ignoring the security and suing on the note."
The rationale of the Oregon court is that the title and text of the act
confine its effect to foreclosure suits, leaving intact plaintiff's independent
action at law on the note.P
It may seem that the arguments in favor of allowing the creditor
to sue on the note are of a rather technical, legalistic nature, when balanced against what seems to be the legislative policy to restrict the
creditor to the property conveyed in purchase money transactions.l"
It
is arguable, however, that restriction of the creditor's right of independent suit for the debt might work to the disadvantage of the purchaser
of land, the very class the statute was designed to protect. "...
[l] f
it be understood that the would-be purchaser lawfully may repudiate his
direct promise to pay the contract price absolutely and at all events, as
evidenced by his promissory note, property owners will not deal with
him."!? It would be more realistic to say that property owners will
deal with the buyer, but will require a larger down paymeut on the
purchase price.
Assuming that suit on the note will be permitted, the next inquiry
is as to the effect of judgment in such suit on the right to forclose.
Oregon decisions intimate, contrary to the usual rule absent a statute.l"
that the right to foreclose a purchase money mortgage is waived by suit
on the note.'?
This result seems clearly sound against the statutory
closure of any mortgage given to secure payment of the purchase price of real
property ... the mortgagee shall not be entitled to a deficiency judgment on account
of the mortgage or note or obligation secured by the same."
In Union Trust Co. v. Wiseman, 10 F. 2d 558 (D. C. D. Ore. 1926), it was
held that a prior action to foreclose the purchase money mortgage dismissed at the
instance of plaintiff did not bar later suit on the note, the institution of the suit to
foreclose not being so inconsistent with the suit on the note as to constitute an
election of remedies. Had plaintiff carried the foreclosure suit to final determination, he would thereafter have been barred from suing on the note, though he did not
realize the full amount of the debt. Wright v, Wimberly, 94 Ore. 1, 184 P. 740
(1919).
"In Wright v. Wimberly, 94 Ore. 1, 44-47, 184 P. 740, 754-755 (1919) (concurring opinion), Harris, ]., points out that the real intent of the statute is to
confine the holder of a purchase money note and mortgage to the mortgaged lands
for satisfaction of the debt. He sustains the holding in Page v. Ford, however, on
the ground that the court could not carry out the real intent of the legislature
without resorting to "judicial legislation." Compare Winkelman v. Sides, 31 Cal.
App. 2d 387, 88 P. 2d 147 (1939), holding that the statute preventing a personal
action until the creditor has exhausted the security (supra note 5) is declarative
of the public policy of the state and may not be waived by a deed of trust purporting to authorize action to enforce payment of a secured debt without a sale
of the property.
re Stou-te Survey, 11 N. C. L. REV.191, 219 (1933).
17 Wright
v. Wimberly, 94 Ore.!, 57, 184 P. 740. 758 (1919) (concurring
opinion), as against the argument that the statute prohibiting deficiency judgments
should be liberally construed in favor of those who buy land.
'" Silvey v. Axley, 118 N. C. 959, 963, 23 S. E. 933, 934 (1896) (dictum);
37 AM. ]UR., Mortgages § 523 (1941).
'" Wright v. Wimberly. 79 Ore. 626, 631, 156 P. 257, 258 (1916); Walters v.
Cooperv Zl Ore. 139, 142 P. 359 (1914).
U

<

496

NORTH

CAROLINA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

background. It is. one thing to allow the creditor to exercise his traditional right to pursue either remedy in the first instance; but it is quite
a different thing to nullify the statutory policy against deficiency judgments by circumlocution.
If the creditor may obtain judgment on the
note, levy on the debtor's general assets, and then make up any balance
due by foreclosure, he would be in effect obtaining a deficiency judgment
in advance.
It is held in North Carolina that a mortgagee cannot subject the
mortgagor's equity of redemption to sale under execution for the mortgage debt."
If North Carolina were also to hold, in accord with Oregon,
that foreclosure, is waived by suit on the note, it would seem that suit
on the note would put the security beyond the reach of the creditor.

ROBIN L. HINsoN.

Criminal Law-Applicability of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act
to Embezzlement and False Pretenses
In United States v. Turley,' the Snpreme Court of the United States
has settled a conflict between the circuits as to the applicability of the
National Motor Vehicles Theft Act? to such crimes as embezzlement
and obtaining goods by false pretenses. The Act, more commonly known
as the Dyer Act, reads as follows:
"Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a
motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen,
shan be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both."?
The area of controversy has been whether to interpret the term
"stolen" as synonymous with common-law larceny, or to allow a broader
interpretation which would include the crimes of embezzlement and obtaining goods by false pretenses.
The fifth,' eighth' and tenth' circuits have held that the term
"stolen" should be limited to the definition of common-law larcency. In
20 McPeters
v. English, 141 N. C. 491, 54 S. E. 417 (1906);
N. C. 52 (1834).

Camp v. Coxe, 18

'77 Sup. Ct. 397 (1957).
'41 STAT.324 (1919), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 2312 (1952).
a Ibid.
'Murphy v. United States, 206 F. 2d 571 (5th Cir. 1932).
Ackerson v. United States, 185 F. 2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950); United States v.
O'Carter, 91 F. Supp. 544 (5. D. Iowa 1949).
6 United States v. Hand, 227 F. 2d 794 (lOth Cir.
1955) (dictum); (jury fouod
the defendant intended to steal car from the inception) ; Hite v. United States, 168
F. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948).
U
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